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Maintaining State Discretion Versus Mandating
Universal Medicaid Coverage:
Renewed Federalism and a Reasonable Standard of
Care under DeSario v. Thomas
Danielle Teachout Uy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act,1 provides medical
assistance to families with dependant children, aged and blind people,
and disabled individuals who do not have the financial resources to
meet their medical needs.2 Congress recently reduced Medicaid
budgets, consequently reducing the scope of Medicaid coverage in
many states.3 These economic and political developments continue to
push the judiciary to examine the fundamental conflict between a
state’s desire to limit the scope of coverage for medically necessary
treatment and Medicaid’s mandate that recipients have reasonable
coverage standards.
The Second Circuit’s decision in DeSario v. Thomas4 created a
circuit split over whether a state Medicaid agency must cover all non-
experimental, medically necessary types of services when no cheaper,
equally effective alternative treatment exists.5 The Second Circuit
allows states to exercise their discretionary powers and place limits
*  J.D. Candidate 2000.
1. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
2. See id.
3. 144 CONG. REC. H4188-01 (1998). Mr. Waxman spoke against the Republican
Leadership’s Budget Resolution for fiscal year 1999. He asserted that the proposed budget will
destroy the medicaid program by slashing federal expenditures for medicaid and children’s
health by $12 billion dollars over the next five years. Id. at H4223.
4. 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998), petition for cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub.
nom., Slekis v. Thomas, 119 S. Ct. 864 (1999).
5. See U.S. Supreme Court Petitioned To Hear DeSario Case! (last modified Aug. 10,
1998) <http://www.aamr.org/NewsDeSario.html>.
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on Medicaid coverage.6 Conversely, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits require state Medicaid plans to provide all medically
necessary services to eligible recipients.7 The Supreme Court granted
the DeSario plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve this
issue.8
On remand a future Second Circuit holding can affect Medicaid
recipients in two ways.9 If the Second Circuit continues to allow
states to exercise their discretionary powers and limit Medicaid
coverage, some recipients will have to look to private charities for
some necessary care and equipment, but Medicaid will still ensure
that the poorest people have an acceptable minimum level of health
care coverage.10 Conversely, if the Second Circuit capitulates and
mandates that states must provide all medically necessary treatment
and equipment, then states may opt out of the federal-state Medicaid
program leaving the poorest people in our society entirely without a
federal-state health care safety net.11
Part II of this Note provides an overview of Title XIX’s historical
developments and coverage limitations. Part III reviews the
applicable Supreme Court cases cited by circuit courts on both sides
of the split. Part IV reviews circuit developments and examines the
courts’ attempts to strike a balance between the different approaches
by various states to moderate costs by limiting coverage for
treatment, care, or equipment and Title XIX’s mandate for a
6. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 69-102 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. DeSario also presented the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to resolve the issues of whether a state Medicaid agency may deny
treatment for rare medical conditions within a mandatory or option benefit category and
whether providing benefits in a federally-funded state-run program to some disabled individuals
and denying those same benefits to other individuals, based on their disabling conditions,
constitutes prohibited discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper. U.S. Supreme Court
Petitioned To Hear DeSario Case! (last modified Aug. 10, 1998) <http://www.aamr.org/
NewsDeSario.html>.
9. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
10. See Bob Herbert, Health Care Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday, July 26, 1998, at Week in
Review 15. (stating that the DeSario decision “may impede needy individuals’ medical
treatment for AIDS, multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy, and renal failure”). See also Brief for
National Multiple Sclerosis Society as Amicas Curiae in Support of Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-6027).
11. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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reasonable standard of coverage. Part IV also extracts the test each
circuit applies to determine whether a state has exceeded its
discretion by limiting Medicaid coverage for medically necessary
treatment. Part V reviews the administrative guidance issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA). Part VI delineates the Supreme Court’s
instructions to the Second Circuit when DeSario v. Thomas was
granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded. Part VII analyzes the
competing views enunciated by the circuits and responds to recently
published administrative guidance. Finally, Part VIII prompts the
Second Circuit to adhere to its population as a whole test and not give
the HCFA’s letter undue deference.
II. MEDICAID’S HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
In 1965 Congress created the Medicaid program under Title XIX
of the Social Security Act.12 Medicaid is a federal-state cooperative
program providing medical assistance to indigent people and is
administered by participating state agencies.13 Accordingly, each
participating state has a wide degree of latitude in the program’s
implementation.14 Although participation is voluntary, states must
meet federally established foundational requirements to qualify for
federal funding.15
Each state must formulate its own plan establishing the medical
services for which funding will be available.16 Although the plan
12. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
13. Medicaid, although established as an adjunct to the Medicare program, is
distinguishable in that Medicare is fully funded and managed by the federal government.
Despite this distinction it is useful to refer to the Medicare regulations for comparative
purposes. Title XIX establishes two groups of needy persons: the “categorically needy” and the
“medically needy.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C), 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(1)-(5)
(1988). “Categorically needy” individuals are families with dependant children, aged, blind, or
disabled people who receive financial aid from federal programs. Id. See generally 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.100-.135, .700-.735 (1993). “Medically needy” individuals are people who do not qualify
for some form of federal assistance but who nonetheless lack the resources to obtain adequate
medical care. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.300-.350, .800-.852 (1993). See generally 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a-1396e (1988).
14. See id.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988).
16. Id.
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must include coverage for five mandatory treatment categories, states
may choose to provide eligible recipients with additional, optional
services.17 Reasonable standards for determining an individual’s
17. The five mandated coverage categories are: inpatient hospital services; outpatient
hospital services; laboratory and X-ray services; skilled nursing services; and physician’s
services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) allows states to elect to
provide coverage for:
Home health care services; private duty nursing services; clinic services . . . ; dental
services; physical therapy and related services; prescribed drugs, dentures, and
prosthetic devices; and eyeglasses prescribed by a physician . . . or by an optometrist
. . . ; other diagnostic, screening, preventative, and rehabilitative services; inpatient
hospital services and nursing facility services, and intermediate care facility services
for individuals 65 years of age or over in an institution for mental diseases.
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(6)-(15) (1988). For this Note’s purposes, home health care is the most
relevant optional Medicaid service and is further defined in regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70
(1993) states:
(a) “Home health services” means the services in paragraph (b) of this section that
are provided to a recipient--
(1) At his place of residence, as specified in paragraph (c) of this section; and
(2) On his physician’s orders as part of a written plan of care that the physician
reviews every 60 days.
(b) Home health services include the following services and items. Those listed in
paragraphs (b)(1), (2) and (3) of this section are required services; those in paragraph
(b)(4) of this section are optional.
(1) Nursing service, as defined in the State Nurse Practice Act, that is provided on a
part-time or intermittent basis by a home health agency as defined in paragraph (d) of
this section, or if there is no agency in the area, a registered nurse who--
(i) Is currently licensed to practice in the State;
(ii) Receives written orders from the patient’s physician;
(iii) Documents the care and services provided; and
(iv) Has had orientation to acceptable clinical and administrative recordkeeping
from a health department nurse.
(2) Home health aide service provided by a home health agency,
(3) Medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home, and
(4) Physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech pathology and audiology
services, provided by a home health agency or by a facility licensed by the State to
provide medical rehabilitation services. (See § 441.15 of this subchapter.)
(c) A recipient’s place of residence, for home health services, does not include a
hospital, skilled nursing facility, or intermediate care facility except for home health
services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded that are not required
to be provided by the facility under subparts F and G of part 442 of this subchapter.
For example, a registered nurse may provide short-term care for a recipient in an
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eligibility for medical assistance and the types of optional medical
services provided must be included to comply with Title XIX’s
objectives.18 In addition, medical services must be sufficient in
amount, duration, and scope to achieve reasonably Medicaid’s
purpose.19 Moreover, the Medicaid agency may not deny or reduce
the amount, duration, or scope of a required service to an otherwise
eligible recipient solely based on diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition.20 However, the agency does retain discretion to limit
covered services unless medically necessary.21
intermediate care facility during an acute illness to avoid the recipient’s transfer to a
skilled nursing facility.
Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1988). The relevant part of the statute reads:
[R]easonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan [must] (A) [be] consistent with the objectives of this
subchapter, (B) provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are,
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to
the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any applicant or recipient who would,
except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance in the form of money
payments under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X, XIV, or XVI, or
part A of subchapter IV, or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security
income benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter) as would not be disregarded (or
set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility for such aid, assistance, or
benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and
(D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any
applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is
such individual’s spouse or such individual’s child who is under age 21 or (with
respect to States eligible to participate in the State program established under
subchapter XVI of this chapter), is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or is
blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title (with respect to States which
are not eligible to participate in such program). . ..
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. Title XIX’s broadly stated primary objective is to enable each State:
[A]s far as practicable . . . to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with
dependant children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2)
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or retain
capability for independence or self-care. . ..
Id.
19. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1998).
20. 42 C.F.R. § 442.230(c) (1998).
21. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1998). For a definition of medical necessity see infra notes
24-26 and accompanying text. Utilization control procedures generally refer to procedural steps
necessary for coverage eligibility. For discussion and examples see infra notes 23 and
accompanying text (delineating Connecticut’s utilization control procedures and necessary
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A state’s decision to provide optional services must be considered
in light of the statute as a whole. Although a state need only provide
the minimum level of coverage, once a state’s coverage goes beyond
the minimum requirements, it is still bound by the statutory and
regulatory language mandating reasonable standards of care for all
provided services.22 Therefore, even if states opt to include additional
services, such as prescription drugs or durable medical equipment,
they must meet federally mandated reasonable standards of
coverage.23
Ambiguity about what treatment is a medical necessity also
procedural steps for coverage eligibility).
22. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1998).
23. See id. One example of Medicaid implementation by the states is provided in DeSario
v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 83, which looks at Connecticut’s program. Connecticut participates in
the joint federal-state Medicaid program and complies with federal mandates by providing the
five mandatory categories of coverage. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83 (citing STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF INCOME MAINTENANCE, CONNECTICUT MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE PROVIDER MANUAL FOR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, DEVICES AND SUPPLIES § 189.D
(“Map Manual”). Connecticut additionally provides “home health care services” for all
Medicaid recipients.
 
Federal regulations define home health care services to include “[m]edical
supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home.” 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3)
(1998). In doing so, Connecticut interprets durable medical equipment as a subset of home
health care. DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83 (citing MAP Manual § 189.B that defines durable medical
equipment (“DME”) as follows:
DME means equipment which meets all of the following requirements:
a. Can withstand repeated use
b. Is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose
c. Generally is not useful to a person in the absence of illness or injury
d. Excludes items that are disposable.)
Connecticut implemented its Medicaid program by limiting DME coverage to items listed
in the Department’s fee schedule. See DeSario, 139 F.3d at 83. Connecticut’s program requires
Medicaid recipients to submit requests for DME through an approved vendor along with a
physician’s prescription.
 
DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. Conn. 1997). Prior
authorization for payment will be granted only if the equipment is itemized on the fee schedule.
Id. Connecticut lacks both regular procedures for periodically updating the fee schedule and a
formal feedback procedure promoting input from Medicaid recipients regarding potential
additions to the fee schedule. Id. at 126. The Medical Equipment, Devices, and Supplies fee
schedule, adopted in June 1993, and revised in June 1996, is the exclusive list of items
Connecticut’s Medicaid program will provide to Medicaid recipients. Id. Between June 1993
and June 1996, no items were added to or removed from the fee schedule. Id. In addition, the
MAP Manual specifically excludes certain equipment and appliances from coverage, such as
room-size humidifiers, purifiers, and dehumidifiers, as well as air conditioners, and stair glides
from DME. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/18
224.doc 08/24/00
2000]  State Discretion Versus Universal Medicaid Coverage 551
complicates states’ efforts to reduce overall coverage while
attempting to maintain federally mandated minimums.24 Congress
used the term medical necessity in the appropriations section of the
Medicaid statute.25 This section sets aside federal funds for
individuals with income and resources insufficient to meet the costs
of necessary medical services.26 Despite statutory references to
medical necessity, Congress has failed to provide state agencies with
any statutory or regulatory definition.27 Therefore, the determination
of what treatment is medically necessary is left to physicians,
participating states, and the courts.
III. APPLICABLE SUPREME COURT CASES
The circuit courts cite two United States Supreme Court cases,
24. The Supreme Court in Beal v. Doe, suggested that medical necessity also contributes
to establishing the minimum level of service and coverage required under the statute by stating,
“[S]erious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary
medical treatment from its coverage.” 432 U.S. 438, 444  (1977).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994). The Appropriations section reads:
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in
such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and
other services to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for
independence or self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal
year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made
available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have
submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical assistance.
Id.
26. Id. § 1396, 1396(a)(10)(C)(i) (1994).
27. See Edward Hirshfield & Gail Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The
Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3 (1996). The article concludes that
whether medical services are in fact medically necessary for a particular patient is often unclear
due to the imprecision of medical science. Id. at 5, 19-21. However, when medical necessity
was a matter determined between a patient and her doctor the impact of this imprecision was
minimized by the fact that the patient’s interests were paramount. Id. at 5. The emergence and
dominance of private health insurance and health maintenance organizations changed cost
benefit analysis to the whole covered population based on the limited resources available to the
group. Id. at 35. Although this article looks to private insurance schemes, the analysis is
analogous to a public scenario. A federal/state Medicaid program places participating states in a
similar predicament where the individual patient’s needs may be subordinated to the needs of
the group as a whole. Hirschfield and Thomas criticize this trend and call for increased
disclosure by private plans to inform potential buyers and to decrease the economic leverage
that health plans have over physicians. Id. at 49-50.
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Beal v. Doe28 and Alexander v. Choate,29 to support divergent
readings of Title XIX.30 In 1977 the Supreme Court decided Beal v.
Doe.31 In Beal female Medicaid recipients challenged Pennsylvania’s
regulation denying coverage for nontherapeutic abortions and
limiting coverage to medically necessary abortions.32 The Court held
that Pennsylvania’s regulation limiting Medicaid funding to
medically necessary abortions fully comports with Title XIX’s
broadly stated primary objective. In addition, the Court stated that
states may provide optional coverage under the federal statutory
language.33 However, the Court cautioned that “serious statutory
questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded
necessary medical treatment from its coverage.”34 The Court
reasoned that Congress did not intend for Medicaid coverage of
nontherapeutic abortions because they were unlawful in most states
when it passed the statute.35 Giving deference to the administering
agency, the Court also looked to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare’s policy.36
More recently, the Supreme Court decided Alexander v. Choate.37
In Alexander a group of disabled Medicaid recipients challenged
Tennessee’s addition of a fourteen-day limit on inpatient hospital
stays under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its
implementing regulations.38 The Court held that plaintiffs failed to
prove a prima facie violation of the Rehabilitation Act.39 The Court
reasoned that Tennessee’s fourteen-day limitation still provided
28. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
29. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
30. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits rely on Beal v. Doe, while the Second Circuit
relies on Alexander v. Choate.
31. 432 U.S. 438.
32. Id. at 441.
33. Id. at 447.
34. Id. at 444. See supra note 18 for the statute’s objective.
35. 432 U.S. at 447.
36. Id. (citing New York Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)). The
Beal court specifically noted that, “the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare . . . takes
the position that Title XIX allows— but does not mandate— funding for such abortions.” Id.
37. 469 U.S. 287.
38. Id. at 289.
39. Id. at 309.
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handicapped individuals meaningful access to Medicaid benefits.40
The Court also stated that Medicaid programs do not guarantee that
recipients will receive a level of health care precisely tailored to their
particular needs.41 Instead, the Alexander Court viewed Medicaid
benefits as a package of health care services serving the population as
a whole.42 This prompted the Court’s additional note that the
fourteen-day limitation was in the best interests of all Medicaid
recipients because ninety-five percent of all Medicaid recipients were
fully served under this limitation.43
IV. APPROACHES TO RECONCILING A DENIAL OF MEDICALLY
NECESSARY CARE WHILE MAINTAINING REASONABLE STANDARDS
UNDER TITLE XIX
Congress failed to define medical necessity within Title XIX. In
addition, states have considerable latitude in the implementation of
state Medicaid plans.44 Therefore, the duty has fallen on the judiciary
to resolve disputes between a state’s desire to reduce coverage to
limit costs and Medicaid recipients’ rights to coverage for medically
necessary treatment, services, or equipment. Consequently, circuit
courts devised different tests to determine when denial of coverage
for physician-determined medically necessary care unacceptably
reduces Medicaid coverage.45 The decisions created a split between
the Second Circuit and the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. The
Second Circuit permits states to limit Medicaid coverage to those
items delineated on a fee schedule, even if a treating physician deems
non-listed equipment or treatment medically necessary.46 Conversely,
the tests enunciated by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits require
40. Id. at 302. “Evidence indicated that, if nineteen days of coverage were provided,
16.9% of the handicapped, as compared to 4.2% of the nonhandicapped, would not have their
needs for inpatient care met.” Id. at 290 n.3.
41. Id. at 303.
42. Id. at 303-04.
43. Id. at 303.
44. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
45. Because few cases address the issue of medically necessary coverage for durable
medical equipment, this Note includes cases involving abortions, organ transplants, AIDS
medication, and sex reassignment surgery.
46. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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that state Medicaid plans provide all medically necessary services to
eligible recipients.47
A. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit traditionally allows more conservative
coverage for Medicaid beneficiaries. In Roe v. Norton, the court
reviewed Connecticut district court’s decision in a class action suit.48
Both class representatives had purely elective abortions.49 The district
court held that Title XIX did not limit Medicaid reimbursement for
abortions under a state medical assistance program to those medically
necessary for the health of the patient, but permits coverage for
elective abortions as well.50 On appeal, the State of Connecticut
contended that Title XIX forbids Medicaid coverage for elective
abortions and only permits coverage for medically necessary
abortions.51 Connecticut posited that “medically necessary services”
appears in only two places in the statute, and each time the term is
used, it only describes persons eligible for medical assistance under
Medicaid.52 Although the Second Circuit rejected appellant’s
argument on appeal and permitted federal reimbursement for elective
abortions, it did not mandate Medicaid coverage for non-medically
necessary elective abortions.53
The Second Circuit has recently taken a stronger position by
endorsing Connecticut’s fee schedule and allowing even mandatory
coverage services to be excluded from Medicaid coverage. In
DeSario v. Thomas the Second Circuit again addressed the scope of
47. See infra notes 82, 89, 102 and accompanying text.
48. 522 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1975).
49. Plaintiff Roe was 26 years old and the unmarried mother of three small children. Id.
She was seven weeks pregnant at the time the suit was instituted. Id. She desired an abortion to
avoid further economic burdens and family complications. Id. Her physician in fact said the
abortion was appropriate, but not medically necessary in the sense that the patient’s life or
health would not be threatened if the abortion were not performed. Id. Plaintiff Poe had an
elective abortion and subsequently was refused Medicaid coverage by the State. Id.
50. Id. at 931.
51. Id. at 932.
52. 522 F.2d at 933. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 937. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the decision with respect to
Connecticut’s regulation’s validity under Title XIX. Id. at 939.
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coverage for medically necessary care.54 In DeSario Medicaid
recipients brought a class action challenging the Connecticut
Department of Social Services’ denial of prior authorization requests
for DME.55 The district court found that Connecticut’s fee schedule
improperly limited the amount, duration, and scope of medically
necessary DME.56 The district court reasoned that the current fee
schedule failed to give recipients, who have been initially denied
coverage, any procedure for systematically, timely, or effectively
updating the fee schedule.57 The district court also said that
Connecticut’s plan had inadequate mechanisms for recipients to
request coverage of an otherwise unlisted item.58
The district court focused primarily on the needs of the individual
Medicaid recipient and required the state plan to meet a two-step
test.59 Following the reasoning in Preterm, the district court in
54. 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 83. One subclass (“Emerson subclass”) challenged coverage denials for
equipment (air purifier, air conditioner, and roomsize humidifier) that was specifically excluded
from the fee schedule. Id. Both representatives suffer from multiple chemical sensitivity and
their treating physicians deemed the prescribed equipment medically necessary. Id. The other
subclass (“The DeSario subclass”) challenged denials for equipment (environmental control
unit) that was neither included nor specifically excluded from the fee schedule. Id. DeSario is a
quadriplegic who requested coverage for this equipment which centrally controls many
appliances and costs approximately $7000-$8000. Id. In addition, Thomas Slekis intervened in
the action; he suffered from severe skin breakdown and sought payment for an “RIK” mattress
(a mattress filled with oil-based liquid and covered with exceptionally loose-fitting sheets that
costs approximately $840 a month to rent). Id.
56. DeSario v. Thomas, 963 F. Supp. 120, 130 (D. Conn. 1997).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 133. The macro-micro analysis was first applied by the First Circuit in Preterm
v. Dukakis. 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979).
In Preterm the plaintiffs challenged a portion of the Massachusetts Acts of 1978 limiting
expenditures of state funds for abortions to those abortions that are “necessary to prevent the
death of the mother” and for women who became pregnant due to acts of rape or incest. Id. at
122-23. The court held that the Act violated the Medicaid requirements. Id. at 127. The court
first looked to language of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C), and found no
mandate among the thirty-seven listed requirements that a state plan provide all medically
necessary treatment in § 1396a. Id. at 124-25. Therefore, the court did not want to “draw the
words ‘necessary medical services’ from their context in the appropriations section and in effect
transport them into a contents section requirement.” Id. at 125. The court found additional
guidance within § 1396d(a), which lists the five mandatory coverage categories for participating
states. Id. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a).
With this analysis and the Supreme Court’s mandate in Beal v. Doe, the Preterm court
fashioned and applyed its two-tiered test. 591 F.2d at 125. The court established that the state
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DeSario said that states must first comport with federal standards on
a macro level with respect to the State’s legislatively defined levels
of mandatory and optional coverage.60 States must then permit the
patient’s treating physician to determine necessary treatment on a
micro level before categorically excluding it from the fee schedule. 61
On appeal the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case.62
Rather than looking to the medical necessity of an item, the court
held that a state does not have to fund every medically necessary item
that falls within the state’s definition of DME.63 The court followed
the Supreme Court’s language in Alexander v. Choate, focusing on
the benefits enjoyed by qualified recipients as a group.64 The court
reasoned that there is nothing in the statute or regulations mandating
coverage of all medically necessary items.65 In addition, because the
State’s definition of DME was found to be reasonable, Title XIX did
not require Connecticut to supply equipment that falls outside that
definition.66 Moreover, the court gave great weight to the economic
arguments presented by the state.67 In doing so, the Second Circuit
formulated a test— optional coverage services and even mandatory
coverage services may be denied to an individual so long as the
legislature must first make a macro-level decision in determining what kinds of medical
assistance are sufficiently necessary to warrant coverage under its state plan. Id. The court then
required that the analysis continue to a second, micro-level where the recipient’s treating
physician must determine whether the individual patient’s condition warrants the administration
of a type of medical assistance available under the state’s Medicaid plan. Id. When the court
applied its test, it also considered the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare pursuant to the Medicaid Act. Id. at 125-26. See also supra notes 19-21
and accompanying text. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1998). The court concluded that
when the statute and regulations were properly applied in concert to the Massachusetts law
limiting Medicaid coverage for medically necessary abortions, it was “unreasonable” and
“wholly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act,” for Massachusetts to provide abortion
services but “deny [treatment] to all those who will not die without it.” 591 F.2d at 126.
60. 963 F. Supp. at 133.
61. Id.
62. 139 F.3d at 84.
63. Id. at 92.
64. 139 F.3d at 93. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 92. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1998); 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), (d)
(1998).
66. 139 F.3d at 92.
67. Id. at 95-98. The court focused on the “as far as practicable” language in the statute
when it warned that if a state were required to provide all medically necessary services, then
coverage would be unlimited and budgeting would be by blank check. Id.
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health care provided is adequate with respect to the needs of the
Medicaid population as a whole.68
B. The Eighth Circuit
In the Eighth Circuit the court considers the individual recipient
paramount and gives the treating physician ultimate discretion in
determining medical necessity. The Eighth Circuit first examined the
issue of Medicaid coverage and medical necessity in Hodgson v.
Board of County Commissioners.69 In Hodgson patients, physicians,
and medical clinics challenged the validity of Minnesota’s Medicaid
statute70 and its coverage of abortion services.71 Minnesota provides
medical assistance to the financially needy under its Medicaid statute
but provides medical payment reimbursements only for abortions that
are medically necessary to prevent the mother’s death or to terminate
a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest.72 The court held that the
Minnesota statute and its implementation were inconsistent with Title
XIX.73 The court reasoned that the basic criterion for determining
68. Id. at 93.
69. 614 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1980).
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.02 subd. 8(13) (West 1978). The statute provides partial or
total reimbursement for the cost of certain specified medical services for persons meeting
economic eligibility requirements may receive. These services include abortion services only if
one of the following conditions is met:
(a) The abortion is a medical necessity. “Medical necessity” means (1) the signed
written statement of two physicians indicating the abortion is medically necessary to
prevent the death of the mother, and (2) the patient has given her consent to the
abortion in writing unless the patient is physically or legally incapable of providing
informed consent to the procedure, in which case consent will be given as otherwise
provided by law;
(b) The pregnancy is the result of criminal sexual conduct . . . and the incident is
reported within 48 hours after the incident occurs to a valid law enforcement agency
for investigation, unless the victim is physically unable to report the criminal sexual
conduct, in which case the report shall be made within 48 hours after the victim
becomes physically able to report the criminal sexual conduct; or
(c) The pregnancy is the result of incest, but only if the incident and relative are
reported to a valid law enforcement agency for investigation prior to the abortion.
Id.
71. 614 F.2d at 605.
72. See supra note 70.
73. 614 F.2d at 608.
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Medicaid coverage is the individual recipient’s medical necessity.74
The Eighth Circuit confirmed its commitment to the individual
recipient in Pinneke v. Preisser.75 In Pinneke the Eighth Circuit ruled
on Iowa’s Medicaid plan that specifically excluded coverage for sex
reassignment surgery.76 The court held that Iowa’s denial of
Medicaid benefits for medically necessary sex reassignment surgery
violated Title XIX.77 The court reasoned that Iowa’s lack of formal
rulemaking proceedings or hearings was inconsistent with Title
XIX’s objectives, because it established an irrebuttable presumption
that non-covered services can never be medically necessary.78 The
court also noted that the individual recipient’s physician bears the
burden of deciding the medical necessity of a treatment.79 The
decision relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Beal v. Doe,
emphasizing the treating physician’s role in determining medical
necessity under the statute.80 In addition, the Eighth Circuit looked to
Title XIX’s legislative history, noting that Congress intended
physicians’ medical judgements to play a primary role in the
determination of medical necessity.81 In doing so, the Eighth Circuit
clearly enunciated a standard of placing the individual recipient as
paramount by giving the ultimate discretion to the physician to
74. Id.
75. 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 547. The plaintiff began life as a male but was uncomfortable with life in that
gender category. Id. She was diagnosed as having a transsexual personality. Id. The only
medical treatment available to treat or solve the problems of a true transsexual is radical sex
conversion surgery; psychoanalysis is not a successful form of treatment. Id. at 548-49. The
plaintiff was eligible for Medicaid benefits but was refused funding for the surgery based on
Iowa’s Medicaid plan that specifically excluded coverage for sex reassignment surgery. Id. at
547.
77. Id. at 549.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 550.
80. 623 F.2d at 549. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 549-50 (citing S.REP. NO. 404, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1986-89).
The report states in part:
The committee’s bill provides that the physician is to be the key figure in determining
utilization of health services— and provides that it is a physician who is to decide upon
admission to a hospital, order tests, drugs and treatments, and determine the length of
stay. For this reason the bill would require payment could be made only if a physician
certifies to the medical necessity of the services furnished.
Id. at 1986.
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determine medical necessity.82
C. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit established its test for determining whether a
state meets Title XIX’s mandate while denying care determined by a
physician to be medically necessary in Dexter v. Kirschner.83 In
Dexter a Medicaid plaintiff brought an action challenging denial of
coverage for an allogeneic bone marrow transplant.84 Arizona’s
Medicaid statute does not cover allogeneic bone marrow transplants
but does provide coverage for autologous bone marrow transplants.85
82. See Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989). In Weaver a class of Medicaid
eligible individuals with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) sued, challenging
Missouri’s denial of coverage for AZT, a common AIDS inhibiting drug. Id. at 195. The
plaintiffs suffered with AIDS and certain AIDS-related complex (ARC) but did not meet the
restricted medical conditions for Medicaid coverage as delineated in Missouri’s adoption of the
Food and Drug Administation’s (FDA) labeling approval. Id. at 196. The FDA’s label stated
that AZT was “indicated for the management of certain adult patients with symptomatic HIV
infection (AIDS and advanced ARC) who have a history of cytologically confirmed
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) or an absolute CD4 (T4 helper/inducer) lymphocyte
count of less than 200/mm in the peripheral blood before therapy is begun.” Id. Despite the fact
that the plaintiffs did not fit this FDA labeling criteria, their respective physicians prescribed
AZT to prevent or retard the progression of the disease to a more serious illness. Id. at 196-7.
The court held that Missouri’s Medicaid program could not deny coverage of AZT, a non-
experimental drug, to Medicaid eligible AIDS patients whose physicians certified that AZT was
a medically necessary treatment. Id. at 200. The court reasoned that the Medicaid statute and
regulatory schemes create a presumption favoring the attending physician’s medical judgment
when determining the medical necessity of treatment. Id. at 198. Missouri’s reliance on the
FDA approval process was insufficient to overcome this presumption. Id. The court asserted
that neither the practice of medicine nor physicians’ exercise of their best professional judgment
in the interest of the patient should be limited or interfered with by the FDA labeling process.
Id.
83. 984 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. Id. at 981. The plaintiff suffered from chronic myelogenous leukemia, which is fatal if
untreated. Id. The required treatment is chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant. Id. The only
effective transplant for plaintiff’s disease is to infuse a matched donor’s marrow; this is a non-
experimental form of treatment. Id.
85. The medical difference between the two procedures is that for allogenic bone marrow
transplants the patient receives matching bone marrow from a donor, whereas with an
autologous bone marrow transplant, the patient receives her own marrow that had been
harvested and stored for latter infusion. Id. at 981. The court focused on two statutes. Id. at 982
(citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2907.A.12, 36-2907.7.F). The two statutes read in relevant part:
[T]he following health and medical services shall be provided pursuant to provider
contracts awarded under this article: . . . . 
Medically necessary kidney, cornea and bone transplants and immunosuppressant
Washington University Open Scholarship
224.doc 08/24/00
560 Journal of Law and Policy [Vol.2:545
The court held that Arizona, as a participant in the Medicaid
program, must provide assistance to all eligible participants for all
medically necessary services that qualify as mandatory coverage
categories but does not have to provide coverage for all discretionary
Medicaid services.86 The court reasoned that since organ transplants
are not among the “required medical services,” the Arizona
legislature can choose to fund one type of bone marrow transplant
while refusing to fund another.87 The court also noted that this
decision was rational given the treating physician’s testimony that the
two types of bone marrow transplants were similar.88 Therefore,
medications for these transplants . . . and, beginning October 1, 1988, medically
necessary liver transplants and immunosuppressant medications for these
transplants. . .. No other organ transplants may be covered by the system unless
specifically required by federal law.
Id. The second statute provides:
Notwithstanding subsection A of this section [of which A.R.S. S 36- 2907.A.12 is a
part], beginning October 1, 1989, the director shall provide medically necessary
autologous bone marrow transplants to a person defined as eligible.
Id.
86. 984 F.2d at 983.
87. Id. at 983-84. See also McCoy v. Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110
(Idaho 1995). The plaintiff in McCoy suffered from morbid obesity. Id. at 111. Her condition
resulted in other health problems including congestive heart failure, hypertension, sleep apnea,
and severe joint problems. Id. Her physician concluded that gastric bypass surgery was
medically necessary. Id. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare denied coverage for
treatment pursuant to a state regulation excluding coverage for all medical procedures treating
obesity. Id. The district court affirmed the Department’s order excluding coverage because it
found that it was appropriate for a state to prioritize the medical needs of its citizens and
allocate funds accordingly. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case,
holding that the Idaho statute was an unreasonable exclusion that arbitrarily denied funding for
all obesity when treatment deemed medically necessary by the individual’s physician. Id. at
114. The court followed the structure devised in Preterm and adopted a two-step test with
respect to medical necessity. Id. at 113. First, the state must decide which non-mandatory
medical services it will provide to its population. Id. The individual recipient’s physician then
decides whether the patient requires the treatment provided by the state plan. Id. The court
continued to follow Preterm’s two-step approach by focusing on whether exclusion under this
analysis was reasonable and consistent with the objectives of Title XIX. Id. Thus, the court
concluded the state’s obesity exclusion was overbroad since it could potentially exclude patient
care where the medically necessary treatment was the only covered treatment for that condition.
Id. In addition, the court found that coverage restricted to life threatening treatments is contrary
to Title XIX’s objectives. Id. See generally supra notes 17-18.
88. 984 F.2d at 984. In adopting the treating physician’s testimony, the Ninth Circuit
disregarded the parties’ stipulated facts stating that “autologous bone marrow transplants and
allogeneic bone marrow transplants are different procedures used to treat different diseases and
have different outcomes and different side effects.” Id.
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although the Ninth Circuit gives states discretion to fund some but
not all optional services, it still requires states to provide coverage to
eligible participants for all mandatory coverage services.89
D. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit requires states to fund all mandatory coverage
services deemed medically necessary. In Visser v. Taylor the plaintiff
sought a preliminary injunction against Kansas Department of Social
and Rehabilitation Services for refusal to provide Medicaid coverage
for a prescription drug, Clozaril.90 A district court held that the state’s
refusal to cover Clozaril in its prescription drug program violated
Title XIX because it was “an arbitrary reduction in the scope of that
service to otherwise eligible individuals, solely on the basis of their
illness or condition.”91 The court reasoned that since Kansas elected
to provide prescription drug coverage under its Medicaid plan, the
state must maintain this service in a manner that is reasonable and
consistent with the objectives of Title XIX.92 Kansas failed to meet
these criteria because the Department’s decision to exclude Clozaril
infringed on the treating physician’s decision making power as to
whether treatment is medically necessary and eliminated funding for
medical services that a qualified physician deemed medically
necessary.93 The court concluded that the state’s failure to cover
Clozaril constituted a refusal to provide prescription drug coverage
for those patients whose condition could not be effectively treated
otherwise.94 A refusal based on the recipients’ illness or condition,
89. Id. at 983.
90. 756 F. Supp. 501, 502-03 (D. Kan. 1990). Plaintiff suffered from schizo-affective
disorder, depressed type as well as hallucinations. Id. at 503. Her physician has recommended
Clozaril to treat her condition because all other drugs had become progressively ineffective and
had potentially irreversible and serious side effects. Id. The plaintiff’s doctors felt that Clozaril
was the only existing drug approved by the FDA that could treat the plaintiff’s schizophrenia.
Id. at 504. In addition to trying numerous other prescription, plaintiff has also received inpatient
treatment and has been hospitalized a total of fifteen times. Id. Hospitalization costs ran from
$150.07 to $211.67 per day and the state bore the full cost of inpatient care. Id. at 505.
91. Id. at 507.
92. Id. at 506. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
93. 756 F. Supp. at 507.
94. Id.
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such as this, violates Title XIX.95
The Court of Appeals further clarified the Tenth Circuit’s position
in Hern v. Beye.96 The plaintiffs in Hern challenged Colorado laws97
excluding all abortions from Medicaid coverage, except those
protecting the life of an expectant mother.98 The court held that
Colorado’s restriction on abortion funding violated federal Medicaid
mandates.99 The court reasoned that Colorado’s Medicaid program
impermissibly discriminated in its coverage of abortions based on the
individual recipient’s diagnosis and condition.100 In addition, the
court reasoned that Colorado’s law was inconsistent with Title XIX’s
basic objective of providing eligible individuals with medically
necessary care.101 The court concluded that Title XIX and its
accompanying regulations require states to fund all mandatory
coverage services that are deemed medically necessary.102
95. Id.
96. 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1995).
97. CO. CONST. art. V, § 50; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-4-512, 26-15-104.5; 10
COLO. CODE REGS. § 2505-10 (8.733) (1988). The relevant portion of the Colorado
Constitution reads:
No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado, its agencies or political
subdivisions to pay or otherwise reimburse, either directly or indirectly, any person,
agency, or facility for the performance of any induced abortion. PROVIDED
HOWEVER, that the General Assembly, by specific bill, may authorize and
appropriate funds to be used for those medical services necessary to prevent the death
of either a pregnant woman or her unborn child under circumstances where every
reasonable effort is made to preserve the life of each.
CO. CONST. art. V, § 50.
98. 57 F.3d at 907. The plaintiffs were a physician and three women’s health care
facilities that provide abortion services to women in Colorado. Id.
99. Id. at 910.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 910-11.
102. Id. at 911. See also Ohlson v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (applying the
Tenth Circuit’s holding from Hern to an optional category of Medicaid coverage). In Ohlson
the plaintiff suffered from spinal muscular dystrophy and was wheelchair bound. Id. at 941. She
required a molded plaster body brace in order to sit up and breathe properly in her wheelchair.
Id. The brace was not surgically implanted but was clamped to the outside of her body. Id.
Without the brace the plaintiff would regress into a slumped position and would eventually
need mechanical assistance breathing. Id. The plaintiff’s doctor deemed the brace to be
medically necessary but the Colorado State Medicaid system denied coverage. Id. The plaintiff
challenged the validity of Colorado’s Medicaid coverage denial for external prosthetic devices
while it simultaneously provided Medicaid coverage for surgically implanted prosthetic
devices. Id. at 943. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-4-302(1)(f) (West 1998 Cum. Supp.). The
court declined to issue a holding and remanded with instructions that “state coverage only for
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V. RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
The Department of Health and Human Services Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), the administrative agency
charged with overseeing the Medicaid program, recently issued an
advisory letter in response to numerous inquiries regarding Medicaid
coverage of DME following the Second Circuit’s DeSario
decision.103 The letter allows states to develop a list of pre-approved
items of DME as an administrative convenience but still requires
states to provide a reasonable and meaningful petitioning procedure
for recipients to request coverage for non-listed items.104 The HCFA
letter stated that failure to provide such a procedure for requesting
non-listed items is inconsistent with Title XIX.105 HCFA additionally
advised that when evaluating a request for coverage of non-listed
DME, a state may not apply a “Medicaid population as a whole”
test.106 The letter warned that application of this test places an
unreasonable burden on the individual Medicaid recipient and
effectively fails to provide any meaningful opportunity for an
internal, administrative appeal.107 Moreover, any list of pre-approved
DME items is merely an evolving document that must be updated
surgically implanted prosthetic devices must be ‘sufficient in amount, duration, and scope’
reasonable to achieve the purpose of prosthetic devices in the scheme of the federal program.”
953 P.2d at 944. In addition, the court outlined two general tests courts used to determine
whether a service offered in part meets this federally mandated criteria. Id. The first test
requires a service be distributed in a manner bearing a rational relationship to the underlying
purpose of providing services to those greatest in need. Id. The second test requires that a
service “meets the needs of the ‘most’ individuals eligible for Medicaid who have a medical
need for the particular Medicaid service.” Id. Although the court remanded the case for further
proceedings, it stated that the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing
currently failed to meet these tests in part because the state conceded that the plaintiff’s body
brace was medically necessary. Id. at 945.
103. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, HCFA Director, to all State Medicaid Directors
(Sept. 4, 1998) (available at <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/smd90498.html>) (clarifying the
Department’s policies on DME coverage under the Medicaid program and the use of coverage
lists. The guidance applies to DME only and not to any other type care covered under the
Medicaid program.).
104. Id.
105. Id. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.70(b)(3), 440.230(b)-(c) (1998).
106. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, supra note 103 (delineating the “Medicaid
population as a whole” test as the individual Medicaid recipient’s burden to prove that absent
coverage of the item requested, the needs of most Medicaid recipients will not be met).
107. Id.
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periodically to reflect changing technology and changing recipient
needs.108
According to HCFA’s administrative guidance, a state complies
with federal Medicaid requirements for individual requests for DME
by fulfilling three criteria.109 First, states must have a timely review
procedure in place for hearing recipient’s non-listed DME coverage
requests.110 Second, states must provide Medicaid recipients and the
general public with materials containing the process, criteria, and pre-
approved list of DME.111 Finally, states must inform beneficiaries of
their right to a fair hearing to determine whether a coverage denial
conflicts with Title XIX.112
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSE
On January 19, 1999 the United States Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari for DeSario.113 The Supreme Court vacated the
Second Circuit’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to
consider further the matter in light of the interpretive guidance issued
by the HCFA.114
VII. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS AND
RESPONSE TO THE HCFA’S INTERPRETICE GUIDANCE
The Second Circuit’s holding and rationale in DeSario115 is
correct and consistent with the most basic federalist principles that
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. According to the letter, the review process must employ:
reasonable and specific criteria by which an individual item of [D]ME will be judged
for coverage under the State’s home health services benefit. These criteria must be
sufficiently specific to permit a determination of whether an item of [D]ME that does
not appear on a state’s pre-approved list has been arbitrarily excluded from coverage
based solely on a diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.
Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted and vacated sub. nom.
Slekis v. Thomas, 119 S. Ct. 864 (1999).
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
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our country was founded on and that provide a basis for Title XIX.116
The United States, unlike countries like Canada, Sweden, and
Denmark, does not constitutionally provide its citizens with the right
to universal health care coverage. Instead, the United States has
established and maintains Medicaid as a joint federal-state system to
provide a minimum level of health care for the poorest people in our
society who cannot afford privately funded medical care or group
insurance and do not qualify for Medicare.117 Because Medicaid only
aims to ensure that the poorest people in our society have a minimum
standard of health care coverage, it logically follows that Title XIX
does not require states to provide coverage for all medically
necessary treatment, equipment, or services.118
Conversely, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits provide an
overly liberal construction of Title XIX by placing the individual
Medicaid recipient as paramount and giving the treating physician
ultimate discretion in determining medical necessity and Medicaid
coverage.119 This reflects a commendable, humanitarian desire to
provide the best available health care to the poorest members of our
society, but if logically extended, this desire to provide universal
health care undermines capitalist and federalist principles.
Additionally, such a broad lending could lead to an inapposite
result in that moderate income or upper-middle class individuals who
purchase group insurance or are coverage by an HMO may be denied
coverage by their private insurers, but the poorest people could
receive any and all medically necessary treatment under Medicaid.
Therefore, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits’ interpretation of
Title XIX gives too much influence to treating physicians and unduly
reduces states’ legislative discretion. In doing so, these circuits ignore
the statutory language “as far as practicable”120 and disregard
Medicaid’s foundational federalist principles.
In addition, the Tenth Circuit’s focus on whether a state’s denial
of Medicaid coverage for a medically necessary treatment or a
116. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 69-102 and accompanying text.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994); see supra note 30.
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medically necessary device impermissibly discriminates based on an
individual’s diagnosis or condition is legally unsupported.121 In
applying Title XIX’s mandate that states may not discriminate based
on an individual’s diagnosis or condition, the Tenth Circuit seems to
rely on an Equal Protection analysis. This reliance on Equal
Protection is misplaced, because even if a Medicaid recipient can
prove that he is part of an identifiable group,122 the claim would
likely receive only the lowest level of scrutiny under Equal Protection
and the state’s denial of Medicaid coverage would be upheld.123
In addition, courts should not give undue deference to the HCFA’s
letter addressed to State Medicaid Directors.124 Traditionally, courts
give a great amount of deference to letters and guidance issued by the
agency charged with administering an Act, but with respect to
Medicaid, HCFA is not solely responsible for administering Title
XIX.125 Title XIX specifically delegates administrative duties to
participating states.126 HFCA’s attempt to influence unduly state
administration is a breach of Medicaid’s federalist-based principles.
States have particularized knowledge about their budgetary
constraints and other needs that must be balanced with health care
(such as roads, schools, low income housing, etc.), they must not give
undue deference to the HCFA’s letter forbidding use of a population
as a whole test.127
121. See supra notes 91-95, 99-100 and accompanying text.
122. A reasonable, hypothetical classification would be a group of very poor people who
live in an inner city or near a toxic landfill where they are exposed to toxic chemicals on a
regular basis and have developed some sort of multiple chemical sensitivity. Unfortunately, this
syndrome is not universally recognized by the courts, nor scientifically or medically proven to
exist.
123. Rational basis review is the lowest level of scrutiny under Equal Protection analysis
and rarely if ever is capable of deeming an Act unconstitutional. See generally 16 B AM.
JUR.2D § 792 (1998).
124. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
126. See id.
127. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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VIII. PROPOSAL
On remand, the Second Circuit should not capitulate and give
undue deference to the HFCA’s letter.128 The Second Circuit should
adhere to its population as a whole test in order to ensure states’
economic viability, uphold their role in Medicaid’s federalist
structure, and ensure continued participation in the program. The
Second Circuit should follow HCFA’s letter only to the extent that it
recommends timely coverage, petition processing, and frequent
updating of pre-approved coverage lists.129
IX. CONCLUSION
Medicaid beneficiaries are not entitled to blanket coverage for all
medically necessary treatment or equipment under Title XIX. The
Second Circuit was justified in establishing a population as a whole
test under Medicaid’s federalist structure and should not give undue
deference to HCFA.
128. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text. If appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, the Court should uphold this position based on Alexander v. Choate. For
discussion of Alexander, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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